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[A] INTRODUCTION
When we think of the purpose of law schools, legal academics are often caught somewhere between the seemingly opposing positions 
of ‘legal education as certification’, on the one hand, and ‘legal education 
as a means of societal transformation’ on the other (Twining 1994: 58). Put 
differently, in engaging with legal pedagogy, our work is often infused by 
the need to mix the ends of social justice/order/transformation with the 
need to produce competent legal professionals, as well as the suggestion 
that there is a tension between these two ends. This suggested tension 
is often exacerbated by assumptions of neutrality and universality in 
operationalizing the aims of legal education especially when such education 
is focused on doctrinal law. Thus, these assumptions obscure the means 
of achieving social change. Our supposedly neutral-universal position in 
legal education predominated by positivism stands in opposition to the 
ends of social justice. This is because our pedagogy remains perpetually 
in support of power and the injustices power produces. Consequently, it 
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Abstract
This article argues that there is a need for more transdisciplinary 
and decolonial approaches to knowledge production in law. 
These approaches need to go beyond a focus on diversity which 
only seeks ways for marginal voices and experiences to be 
absorbed into a hierarchized structure of knowledge production 
that in turn [re]produces a hierarchized world. New ways must 
be sought to ensure that, in reconsidering the purposes of law 
and law schools, legal education does not reproduce inequalities 
but unravels them. Thereby legal education may do more than 
just add to and diversify the profession but may aspire to 
transform the world.
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could be contended that diversity in legal education would be a good way 
of bringing in a variety of voices into the field to ensure social justice. This 
has been the approach of many law schools in the UK, as they attempt 
to increase gender, class and ethnic diversity in their student and staff 
bodies. However, in this essay, I argue that to attain any transformative 
aims of legal education, we need to go beyond diversity and confront 
our discipline’s entanglements with power. If the discipline instinctively 
aligns itself with power, diversity merely diversifies the face of power, but 
does nothing to fundamentally dilute its effects.
Knowledge production and transmission of law within legal education 
often erase law’s own ontology and histories, producing an illusion of 
innocence, universality and neutrality (Peller 2015). Unsurprisingly, the 
‘core’ legal curriculum is silent about the law’s involvement in the way 
the world has, through colonial logics and for colonial purposes, been 
artificially binarily ordered, as well as the connection between the national 
and the international spheres of legal epistemologies and histories. The 
curriculum is therefore unable to draw connections between legal histories 
and legal presents that account for social injustice, global inequality, 
extreme poverty and environmental degradation. Consequently, doctrinal 
law is unable, of itself with only reference to itself, to provide a true self-
portrait for educators to transmit to learners. Thus, unable to create a 
true picture of humanity, traditional legal education suffers functional 
decay, serving no other purpose than certification into a discipline which 
disciplines the world to conform to a seemingly perfectly pre-ordained but 
wholly unequal legal order.
The purpose of this essay is to explore how legal education, especially where 
the focus is on doctrinal law, exemplifies functional decay and to argue that 
more transdisciplinary and decolonial approaches to knowledge production 
in law are needed to counter this. Some transdisciplinary approaches within 
legal education have already been modelled by critical-legal and socio-legal 
scholarship within the field. I argue here that those models are exemplary 
but need to account more closely for coloniality in the field. 
[B] THE PURPOSES OF LAW SCHOOLS IN UK 
HIGHER EDUCATION: A REFLECTION ON ‘THE 
PRESENT SYSTEM’
The ‘core’ of legal education is a disputed concept, and debates about a 
core are increasingly affected by and reflected in the different approaches 
to legal education often found within law schools (Ansley 1991: 1513-
1520). These approaches include the more predominant traditional 
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doctrinal approach to legal education (Thornton 1998: 372), which is 
often complemented by socio-legal and critical-legal approaches to legal 
study. The continued dominance of doctrinal law, as Thornton argues, 
arises from law’s propensity to reflect the interests of the powerful (1998: 
370-372). Consequently, capital interests and power direct the ontology 
of law and, therefore, legal education, causing a seeming commitment 
of doctrinal law to ‘rules rationality’ and protection of capital (Thornton 
1998: 372). Darian-Smith, who describes the ontology of modern law 
as ‘Euro-American’, echoes and complements Thornton’s argument, 
by tracing law’s current origins to the economic power dictates of the 
colonial project (2013 and 2015). Thus, Euro-American law, according to 
Darian-Smith, is law which began in Europe, but also arose out of colonial 
activities in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Oceania, and whose ontology 
places Euro-America at the centre of the world (Darian-Smith 2013). This 
designation intimately ties law to coloniality’s interests, origins and uses. 
Further to this is the fact that the outcome of the colonization of most of 
what is now designated the Global South was the transplantation of this 
ontology of law across the world (Darian-Smith 2015: 647). Thus, this 
globalization of a particular vision of law (and humanity) is implicated in 
the definition of coloniality—an ontological condition of modernity which 
outlives colonialism and describes ‘long-standing patterns of power 
that emerged as a result of colonialism … that define culture, labor, 
intersubjective relations, and knowledge production’ (Maldonado-Torres 
2007: 243). It is the long-standing patterns of power, the mechanisms 
for reproducing them and their outcomes, that are of concern here. 
Coloniality as a mechanism of material accumulation and dispossession 
of necessity produces specific inequalities. 
In response to power-driven inequalities before and occasioned by law, 
critical-legal and socio-legal studies have leant heavily on the boundaries 
that law places between itself and social realities in their troubling of 
the ‘core’ and the predominance of legal positivism in legal education. 
Yet, even in adopting these approaches, law teachers are often also 
compelled, frequently by market forces, to apply rules-based approaches 
favoured by doctrinal law (Thornton 1998: 374). Furthermore, these non-
traditional approaches, though critical of entanglements of power, being 
and knowledge in legal education, sometimes take an atomized approach 
to confronting power, either conceptually, jurisdictionally, spatially, or 
temporally. Decolonial approaches may bridge this gap. 
As Thornton argues, adherence to ‘rules-rationality’ in legal education 
arises due to law’s close alliance with corporate power and capitalist 
interests and desires to accumulate (1998: 373-375). Therefore, the 
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content of the disputed core of legal education (quite similar in the Euro-
American legal academy) reflects imperatives that expedite the freedom 
of the market, private property ownership and the value of corporate 
power to capital (Thornton 1998: 373). Therefore, recognizing the law as a 
product of coloniality—that is, the fusing, globalizing and universalizing 
of the market and racialization as the dominate mode of control (Quijano 
2000: 216, 230)—requires an exploration of legal education and the limits 
of inclusivity in confronting law’s coloniality. Strictly speaking, inclusivity 
on its own does not adequately address or confront the fusing of capital 
and racialization within legal epistemologies.
To begin, it is important to appreciate the context in which UK law schools 
operate at the end of the first 20 years of the 21st century. The world is 
faced with massive challenges such as global inequality, extreme poverty 
and environmental disaster. All these continue to occur, in a context of 
increasing requests for diversity in the content of legal education and in 
the composition of the professoriate, as well as calls for diversity in the 
profession—including the judiciary (Matiluko 2020: 558).1 Furthermore, 
the debates as to what amounts to ‘decolonization’ in education—which 
have always been vocal in settler colonies and post-colonial states—have 
extended to the UK (Kwoba & Ors 2018: especially 3-5). The presence and 
silence of the nexus of law, power and subjectification in these discourses 
directs our enquiries as legal academics into the purposes of the law 
school. In other words, if law schools are to have any transformative 
effect on society, how have they responded and how can they respond to 
some of society’s most challenging questions?
In examining the purpose of law schools and the search for a core for 
legal education, Twining reflects, among other things, on the persistence 
of the presumed neutrality of law and legal education as he states that, 
‘[t]he most common model for “legal science” is the idea of systematic, 
objective, neutral exposition of the law as it is’ (1994: 155). Nevertheless, 
this is not necessarily a perspective to be treated with suspicion, as it 
could be argued that, to teach law as transformative, ‘law as it is’ has 
to be taught first. Therefore, students must understand doctrinal law 
first, before they can go on to critique it, even where law schools aspire 
to transformative purposes of legal education. The positivist aspect of the 
law has frequently been intellectually critiqued, yet positivism, despite 
signs of decline, still retains a hold in legal education (Thornton 1998: 
372; Tamanaha 2007: 35-38). Also problematic is the fact that presumed 
neutrality does not hope to teach the world as it is, but the world from 
1 On 8 March 2021, six Members of Parliament sponsored an Early Day Motion asking, inter alia, 
for an increase in ethnic diversity in the judiciary: Representation and the Judiciary.  
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the perspective of power, calling into question our presumptions about 
the nature of law itself. As Twining explains, this focus on positivism may 
‘confine legal studies to exposition’, demonstrating the epistemological 
universalization and expansion of the standards of the sciences to other 
fields (1994: 154-155). 
Twining identifies two main cardinally opposite proposals for the 
purposes of law schools and several intermediate hybrid options. 
These two extremes are: on the one hand, law schools as a conduit to 
produce more practitioners for the profession; on the other, law schools 
as spaces for academic learning about law (1994: 52). He complicates 
these extremes by noting how the increase in different specialisms and 
multiple perspectives within the law is in tension with the elusive search 
for a core of legal study (1994: 153-154). However, he notes that to 
keep the law school economically and socially relevant there should be 
a diversity of perspectives about legal knowledge (1994: 197). Through 
their universities, diversity measures in UK law schools have included 
widening participation schemes, diversification of reading lists, and 
mentoring programmes, as well as inclusive recruitment policies (Hoare 
& Johnston 2011: 29; Ragavan 2012; Vaughan 2019; Pilkington 2020). 
In addition to this, various scholarly outputs have emerged over the 
last couple of decades that discuss how best to achieve diversity in the 
profession and in law schools (see, for example, Bhabha 2014; González 
2018; Vaughan 2019). 
There is, however, an oversight here. Firstly, there is no consensus on 
the objectives of diversity measures—apart from diversity itself. Thus, this 
type of diversity discourse seems to presume that all that is required for 
societal transformation is inclusion of a variety of suitable sources and 
voices into the pre-existing study of law, rather than engagement with 
any re-examination of the history and ontology of law and legal education. 
This consequently ignores the possibility that re-examination and then 
reconstruction of the discipline will bring about more organic diversity 
and inclusion. These diversity measures do not address why our discipline 
persistently reproduces inequalities, not just within the law school, but 
across the spectrum of the field, in the impact of law and in the profession. 
Therefore, critical pedagogists, within and outside legal education, have 
long asked us to query our presumptions of neutrality and objectivity in 
both the content and structure of educational systems. Hence, on the 
question of purported neutrality in education, Freire asserts: 
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education 
either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the 
integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present 
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system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes ‘the practice 
of freedom,’ the means by which men and women deal critically 
and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the 
transformation of their world (2018: 34).
Law is very strategically placed as a discipline and profession to 
contemplate the transformation of the world. In fact, one could argue 
that without some engagement with law—the tool of social order—societal 
transformation proceeds in vain. There is also a societal perception that 
one of the functions of law and the legal profession is to achieve social 
justice and societal transformation (Budlender 1992; Elsesser 2012). Yet 
it has been shown that legal education may actually move students away 
from social justice as a career expectation and closer to more corporate-
focused careers (Sherr & Webb 1989; Chapman 2002; Sheldon & Krieger 
2004). One may ask then to what extent legal positivism in legal education 
hinders it from producing social justice. Thus, Cownie & Ors suggest that 
if the study of law focuses solely on the black-letter tradition, we ignore 
the ‘social effect and political impact’ of legal study; consequently, they 
also posit, law schools often focus on what the law is, to the detriment of 
what law can or should be (2013: 126-127). It could be argued therefore 
that, to the extent that they focus on the black-letter tradition, especially 
as regards the interests of power, law schools privilege order over justice. 
Yet Gordon asks us to examine whether our understanding of ‘justice’ 
under the shadow of coloniality actually reflects what is ‘right’ and 
emancipatory (2020: 33-49). In other words, have we confused ‘order-
aligned-to-power’ with ‘justice’? Thus, in our present condition, if legal 
pedagogy and practice presumes politically neutral, value-free praxis (see 
hooks 2014: 37), ‘order’ requires increased deployment of state power 
in the face of racial, gender, class and other disparities. Nevertheless, 
the logics of the present system are inevitably unveiled in structurally 
produced disparities that do not require individual bias—for example, 
the racialized processes which led the Macpherson report (after the 
inquiry into the police investigation following the racist killing of Stephen 
Lawrence) to declare the police institutionally racist. The report defined 
institutional racism as: 
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate 
and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, 
or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes 
and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting 
prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which 
disadvantage minority ethnic people (Macpherson 1999: 49). 
A more comprehensive definition was given at the inquiry, by the 
Commission for Racial Equality, as: 
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established laws, customs, and practices which systematically reflect 
and produce racial inequalities in society. If racist consequences 
accrue to institutional laws, customs or practices, the institution 
is racist whether or not the individuals maintaining those practices 
have racial intentions (Macpherson 1999: 47).
These structurally produced racial disparities are not confined to the legal 
system but were and are repeated in the ‘Windrush scandal’ and ethnically 
disparate vulnerability to Covid-19. Thus, institutional racism is one of 
the more fundamental logics of ‘the present system’ (Freire 2018: 34) that 
legal education reproduces, locally and globally. It cannot be denied that 
this ‘present system’ is becoming more inclusive and diverse, with legal 
academia in the Global North opening itself up to plural epistemologies 
(Darian-Smith & McCarthy 2016: 16-18). The increase in social-legal and 
critical-legal approaches in legal education demonstrates this increased 
inclusivity. However, inclusivity does not always address the inequalities 
power produces. Coloniality as an epistemological technology of power 
requires diversity within its work to normalize and normativize it. In other 
words, to be effective, coloniality must of necessity include those ‘othered’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2017: 123). It is important therefore to not confuse 
inclusivity with decoloniality. 
I focus here specifically on racial disparities precisely because of the 
entrenched enfoldment of racialization in the production of the coloniality 
in the present system. Law and the social construction of race are 
implicated in creating a nebulous scale of master, subject and object that 
contributes to creating and maintaining hierarchical binaries (Haney-
Lopez 2006: especially 7-14; Gómez 2010). What we often conventionally 
understand as ‘race’ has already been established as having no biological 
meaning (Saini 2019). More accurately, the artificial production and 
historical use of race as a technology creates and reproduces contrived 
material distinctions between groups of humanity (Patel 2020: 1464). 
In the here and now, groups are more often racialized by skin colour, 
but historically also by ‘ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural identity’ 
(Grosfoguel 2016: 11). Consequently, it must be understood that the 
logics of racialization overlap, albeit imperfectly, with creation of class 
divides—in fact the whole point of racialization (the creation of ‘race’ 
as a supposedly legitimate categorization of humanity) is to materially 
dispossess. Thus, the entanglement between race and class is more 
entrenched than social policy or public discourse often acknowledges. 
In other words, race was used to mark differences between who can be 
owned and who can own and who can own what; to mark differences 
between whose knowledges, practices and jurisprudences were considered 
‘modern’ and whose were considered primitive; and to mark differences 
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between whose land could be appropriated and who could lay claim to 
territory (Harris 1993; Keenan 2017; Bhandar 2018). These processes 
and techniques of racialization required the legitimation of law, not 
just in legislation and judicial precedent,2 but also in the development 
of seemingly race-neutral legal epistemologies that are actually racially 
contingent (Bhandar 2011; Bhandar 2014: 206-208). Ultimately, ‘race’ 
is a technology used to underpin the enfolded practices of accumulation 
and dispossession that characterize and reproduce this present system, 
creating and maintaining a binary world (Hickel 2017: chapter 3). In the 
words of Grosfoguel, ‘race constitutes the transversal dividing line that 
cuts across multiple power relations such as class, sexual and gender 
at a global scale’ (2016: 11). A predisposition to black-letter tradition, 
especially curricular absences on the social construction of race and its 
attendant effects, inescapably preserves ‘the present system’.
The plethora of racialized and gendered deficits and disparities within 
society is not accompanied by a deficit of data of those disparities. For 
example, the ‘End of Mission Statement’ of the Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary Forms of Racism, at the end of her visit to the UK, 
reported significant racialized disparities in schooling, welfare, housing, 
employment, immigration policies, counterterrorism policies etc (Achiume 
2017). The Lammy Review, which assessed racial disparities in the 
criminal justice system, also reported disparities at every stage, from 
investigation to sentencing (Lammy 2017).3 As racial disparities expose 
groups to increased structural vulnerability, it is not entirely surprising 
to note their replication in vulnerability to Covid-19. The 2020 Public 
Health England report showed that non-white populations in England 
had a ‘10 and 50% higher risk of death when compared to White British’ 
(2020: 39). Furthermore, in November 2020, the American Medical 
Association recognized racism—systemic, cultural and interpersonal—
as a ‘public health threat’ (2020). Predictably, despite diversity, racial 
disparities also exist in higher and legal education, characterized in 
differences in representational and awarding outcomes, employment and 
progression to research degrees (Advance HE 2020a: 130-197; Advance 
HE 2020b: 126-165). It is important to interrogate assumptions that the 
replication of racial disparities is merely incidental and not produced by 
the dominant epistemologies and structures of the world. In fact, these 
2 See, for example, Charter granted to the Company of Royal Adventurers of England Relating to 
Trade in Africa, 1663; Slave Code for the District of Columbia; The Treaties of Utrecht (1713); Gregson 
v Gilbert (1783) 3 Doug KB 232 summary of first trial; French Code noir (1685).
3 The Lammy review has been criticized for not exploring the root causes of disparities and 
regressing understanding of institutional racism. See Fekete 2018: 76-79. 
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disparities, that we benignly refer to as institutional racism, are, in the 
words of Marchais: 
neither a by-product nor ‘negative externality’ of otherwise inclusive 
systems, nor a remnant of old days that is dissipating with time 
and increased awareness. [Racism] is a resource, or a technology, 
on which institutions and organisations rely to achieve production 
(2020).
We must ask ourselves to what extent and why does our discipline 
exemplify this [re]production?
[C] THE FAILINGS OF DIVERSITY: EPISTEMIC 
INJUSTICE AND DISCIPLINARY DECADENCE 
IN LEGAL EDUCATION
To counter disparities within the legal system, systemic racial diversity 
has been promoted through widening participation, mentoring, targeted 
bursaries etc. For example, many of the Lammy Review recommendations 
propose more transparent and detailed collection of data as well as increased 
representation. Recommendation 16 asks for a more representative 
judiciary, while recommendation 29 asks for increased diversity in the 
leadership of the prison service (Lammy 2017). These recommendations 
find similar threads within the Special Rapporteur’s report on racism, 
which recommends in-depth assessment of data and inclusion of 
representatives of racialized communities in decision-making processes. 
However, it is argued that, despite the good intentions of diversity, there 
are two inherent limitations in this approach to transforming the present 
system of law, legal education and our world. Firstly, this approach does 
little to interrogate the processes by which legal education contributes to 
the [re]production of the present system. Currently legal education in UK 
law schools often only engages with scholarship on race and racialization 
in a limited way. Race, racism and racial inequality are not included 
in the ‘core’ curriculum. Stanley examines the general curricula of law 
schools in this regard, citing the tendency of law schools and qualifying 
law degree criteria to prioritize private law above public law and how 
this prioritization places emphasis on the needs of privileged sections of 
society (1988: 83). Thus, private law is focused on regulation of ownership 
of property, without considering, as has been discussed above, how the 
emergence of property is itself racially contingent. Therefore, our focus 
within private property legal education fails to acknowledge, in the words 
of Bhandar, ‘the constitutive relationship between property law and 
racial subjectivity’ (2018: 21). Consequently, the teaching of property law 
437Should We Rethink the Purposes of the Law School?
Spring 2021
is often directed towards power rather than away from it. For example, 
land law is part of the ‘core’ curriculum, while housing law is sometimes 
to be found as an option. Furthermore, even though the practices of 
slavery and colonial dispossession are germane to the development of 
the doctrines within real property, they are hardly to be found in main 
land law texts (Ansley 1991: 1523-1525; Bhandar 2018: 3-4). The second 
inherent limitation to representational diversity schemes is that, rather 
than engaging in any real structural change, this approach averts our 
gaze outwards, to create what DuBois calls ‘problem people’ who become 
the subject of our ineffectual benevolence (1897). 
The real tangible question of ‘justice’ is thus reduced to a metricized 
or a ‘tick-box’ diversity scheme which ignores the many intersectional 
and variable ways in which structural and epistemic injustice is in turn 
epistemically produced, reproduced and experienced. Thus, Gordon 
critiques our understanding of ‘justice’ which is produced by and within 
colonial knowledge hierarchies when he asks: ‘Are the norms for which 
many of us are fighting in the name of, say, racial justice or liberation from 
antiblack racism free of normative colonization …?’ (2020: 91). As Fricker 
maintains, epistemic/hermeneutical injustice is the obscuration of an 
othered group’s social condition from hegemonical understanding (2007: 
152-169). Therefore, those with power to influence change are unable (and 
unwilling) to transform the conditions of those othered. Consequently, 
epistemic erasures create an inherently unequal world. Furthermore, if 
legal education does not interrogate how the world is epistemically and 
structurally ordered, it contributes to reproducing Grosfoguel’s dividing 
line that casts othered populations ‘below the line of the human’ (2016: 10); 
or Fanon’s zones of nonbeing into which those who have been ‘made black 
of the world’ are placed (2008: 2); or de Sousa Santos’ abyssal line which 
invisibilizes the effects of coloniality from those who benefit from coloniality 
(2015: 70-71). These demarcations manifest, for example, in how we define 
those who belong to certain spaces and can confidently claim the benefits 
of belonging. For instance, El-Enany explains how immigration laws have 
entrenched racialized thinking into their provisions, thus mirroring the 
Manicheanism inherent in the creation of race as a supposedly legitimate 
category of humanity (2020: 62).
Therefore, epistemic justice requires more than promoting diversity by 
focusing our gaze on those whom the structures of the world disadvantage, 
rather than on the structure of the world which disadvantages. In effect, 
this approach to racial inequality resorts to ‘managing the demands for 
equality while keeping racial hierarchies intact’ (Saha: 2017). Because 
diversity measures, as described, make no distinction between epistemic 
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and embodied difference, they operate as an inaccurate, limited-temporal 
and aesthetic solution to much more structural problems—concealing 
the longue durée effects of coloniality and its related practices (Raghavan 
2018). Diversity measures, when proposed as a means for societal 
change, work on the presumption that objective epistemic knowledge is 
settled and naturally flows from particular bodies. For example, without 
interrogating further, an assumption that all women are feminists, all 
Black people are versed in critical race theory and all people from a 
working-class background are anti-capitalist would prospectively lead 
to recruiting women, Black and people with working-class backgrounds 
who have none of the aforementioned characteristics respectively, as they 
would be more likely to ‘fit’ into the hegemonical knowledge structure. 
Properly done, representational data should serve as a means of assessing 
how transformational and inclusive our structures are. But the data now 
operates as a target, thus drastically reducing the efficacy of such data 
as a measure. Therefore, we may adopt a tokenistic focus on producing 
good data rather than equitable structures. As hooks noted about such 
inclusive teaching in the USA, ‘many people supported inclusion only 
when diverse ways of knowing were taught as subordinate and inferior 
to the superior ways of knowing’ (2003: 47). Thus, diversity, without 
more, runs the risk of reifying hierarchical structures. We must not forget 
that ‘diversity’ is a natural characteristic of humanity; racial and other 
disparities result from our structural failure to recognize and communicate 
across pluriversal worlds to create a different global epistemic community 
than the one we have now (Kothari & Ors 2019: xxviii). The focus here 
is epistemological: why do the racialized absences within the law school 
curriculum seated within a typical UK law school seem to impede the 
curriculum’s ability to transform society effectively and positively? What 
is it about the related ontology and epistemology of law that reproduces 
disparities in the design of society? 
Gordon calls this phenomenon ‘disciplinary decadence’, which he argues 
sets in because ‘we treat our discipline as though it was never born and 
has always existed and will never change or, in some cases, die’ (2015: 4). 
Building on DuBois’ conceptualization of ‘problem people’, Gordon 
describes how disciplinary practices elevate disciplinary methodology 
to a sacrament—complete, pure and perfect (2018: 233); this creates a 
problem for the discipline of populations not considered part of the core of 
humanity at the time the discipline’s method and thought was formulated. 
‘Problem people’ will not ‘fit’ into the purportedly universal and objective 
method. So, we try in vain using diversity measures to fit such people 
into the strict dictates of the discipline, yet the field keeps on spitting 
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them out. Disparities remain and are reproduced, across time, across 
space. Consequently, within this intractable adherence to method, ‘non-
normative people, become problems, instead of people who face problems’ 
(Gordon 2014: 84). Our legal epistemologies exist as if internally and 
immortally legitimized (Gordon 2011: 97), yet the scope of non-normative 
people increases, as does the scope of problems our discipline is unable to 
understand, including problems resulting from the ontology of our thought 
and method. Thus, our analysis of injustice faced by non-normative people 
descends into a form of victim-blaming. We do not revisit the foundational 
norms of our discipline such as liberty, freedom and justice. We are unable 
to adapt to changing sociological realities and realizations. This is what 
Gordon means by decay—turning from living thought. By trapping our 
discipline in thought that crystallized during a time when race science was 
used to abstract property out of humanity through the legalized processes of 
enslavement and colonial dispossession, we trap our world into reproducing 
the accompanying injustices of those epistemologies along those racial, 
gendered and geopolitical lines. Disciplinary decadence operates along 
colonial lines, creating zones of closure, settlement and negation of human 
possibility (Gordon 2018: 238). By trapping possibility within disciplinary 
dictates, transformation is rendered impossible. Rather than justice, 
anything that exists on the other side of Grosfoguel’s ‘dividing line’, beyond 
the abyssal line, in the zone of nonbeing, is eliminated or transformed to 
resemble this side of the line (numbers-diversity) (de Sousa Santos 2015: 
120). This is what makes ‘the claim of the universal translatability of the 
English word “justice” … an extraordinarily presumptive one’ (Gordon 2013: 
70). Epistemic injustice that arises through the obscuring of racialized 
knowledge cannot be assuaged by obscuration of racialized knowledge. To 
mean anything at all, our quest for global justice must be preceded and 
accompanied by an exploration of how the law’s present ontology has been 
produced through colonial epistemologies of language use and practices. 
[D] WHAT DECOLONIAL THOUGHT MEANS 
FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
If, as argued, legal ontology and epistemology systematically (re)produce 
coloniality and its attendant injustice, what would it mean to introduce 
decolonial thought into legal education? First, it is argued that, to avoid 
the data decay that is inherent in diversity measures, decoloniality cannot 
be approached as a tick-box exercise. To be effective, legal academics 
must familiarize themselves with decolonial theory and put that theory 
in conversation with areas of their pre-existing expertise. Secondly, it is 
argued that the use of the word ‘decolonization’ has proven misleading, 
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fungible and almost infinitely malleable. This confusion is evidenced in 
the use of phrases such as ‘decolonized curriculum’ or ‘decolonized law 
school’. Despite the variances within the schools of decolonial thought, 
at its heart it is a way of being and not a destination. At one end of the 
spectrum, decolonization (mainly articulated by post-colonial and anti-
colonial scholars from Asia and Africa) seeks to repair the remnants of 
the colonial project as they appear and reappear in epistemic, political, 
legal and economic structures (see, for example, Nehru 1941; Nkrumah 
1966; Cabral 1979; Sankara 1988). At the other end of the spectrum, 
decolonial scholars (mainly from the Americas and indigenous scholars) 
seek to identify and dismantle the permanence of coloniality and to 
build in its place flourishing planetary futures—‘worlds otherwise’ 
(Quijano 2000; Escobar 2007; González 2018). Decolonial thought is 
thus unified on the origins and manifestations of coloniality, but there is 
complexity in how the colonial condition is temporalized, contemporarily 
and historically. The desired outcome of decolonial thought also varies. 
This complexity further results in overlaps between these two extreme 
positions: however, both positions can be understood as material and 
epistemic repudiations of the colonial that seek within their positions 
an ‘after-colonial’ time and reality. Thus, taking decolonial approaches 
requires legal academics to continuously commit to communicate 
democratically across epistemological worlds without valorizing or 
universalizing Euro-American legal thought. Decolonial thought does not 
mean replacement but, instead, seeks ways to bring about new worlds of 
thinking and being that are inclusive of plural systems of (legal) thought 
and do not reproduce the harms of coloniality, which include racial, 
class and gender injustice, as well as the resulting global poverty and 
climate emergencies (Maldonado-Torres 2006: 117). So, we must trouble 
the ways in which the norms of our discipline and areas of expertise are 
complicit in that social reproduction of these structural injustices. This 
is the epistemological task. The structural and representational tasks of 
interrogating our institutional practices and ensuring epistemic diversity 
are instrumental to this. However, without the epistemological task, the 
structural and representational changes operate in vain. 
It is further argued that, beyond identification of the norms of social 
reproduction, we must also theorize on what lies beyond. What other 
worlds of justice and freedom do we think our discipline can help bring 
about? On the one hand, there is the task of deconstructing the colonial, 
but, for the imperial world to not rebuild itself, we must replace it with 
new systems of thought, new relations between groups of humanity and 
new relations between humanity and other inhabitants and parts of the 
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planet. It is accurate practice and theorization of decolonial thought that 
confronts us with the history and effects of imperialism upon our academic 
practices (i.e. research and teaching) in law. It is both theory and praxis 
that lead us to new ideas. In a lot of the discourse on decolonization in UK 
higher education, there has been an overwhelming focus on decolonial 
practice and decolonizing in teaching, to the detriment of decolonial 
theory and research. To create radically different futures designed upon 
just legal ontologies and epistemologies, decolonial theory must take 
on a future-looking aspect regarding the survival of the earth and its 
inhabitants (Mignolo 2007:159). So, in rethinking the purposes of the law 
school, either in the fundamentals of what we teach—this includes the 
content of the disputed core—or the way in which we teach—with a focus 
on research or legal practice—we need to consider how legal education 
can, in being self-critical, disrupt normative universals complicit in the 
social production of epistemic and epistemically produced injustices.
There are three main themes through which, I argue, this social 
reproduction is articulated in law. The first is the body. A lot of legal 
thinking is parsed through what we could consider ‘the normative body’. 
This is the body of law’s ideal human, which, according to Douzinas, 
finds its closest representation in a White property-owning man (2000:7). 
The normative body is ‘rational’, seeks protection of his property and has 
converging interests and desires that find solace in the state. Thus, the 
normative body serves as the yardstick against which all negative and 
positive derogation is measured. The normative body gives us the template 
of the ‘reasonable man’ (more recently the critiqued ‘reasonable person’ 
(Moran 2003)) within the law of obligations. Due to the representational 
deficits in the legislative and judiciary, this normative body is the prism 
through which law is made, interpreted and enforced. The normative 
body achieves its positionality through the auspices of capital—this 
body is the one positioned to achieve the most capitalist value, not 
hindered by gendered roles, racialization, heteronormative assumptions, 
class distinctions or inflexible ideas of ability. As argued above, justice 
articulated from this personification of law’s human is not infinitely 
translatable.
The second theme of social reproduction is property. As mentioned 
above, the making of property in law happens contemporaneously with 
the emergence of law’s ideal human. Critical legal scholars, as well as 
postcolonial writers, have maintained a long trajectory of writing on the 
elision of body and property—especially the consequent Euro-modern 
manifestation of land as property. In her seminal work, Harris argues that 
‘whiteness’, originally socially constructed as racial identity, morphed 
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into a form of property which, in the past and present is acknowledged 
and protected by law in the USA (1993). Moreton-Robinson makes a 
similar argument within the Australian indigenous context, contending 
that the interplay of socially constructed race and property law provides 
a biosphere of and for possession and dispossession (2015). These 
arguments are echoed by Bhandar, whose context includes indigenous 
Canada, apartheid South Africa and contemporary Palestine. She argues 
that racialization and property-making developed co-terminously (see, 
particularly, 2014: 211). Ways of using land by populations racialized 
as ‘not-white’ served to dispossess them of property which could then be 
appropriated by colonizing forces. These arguments about property are 
reflected in the concept of racial capitalism, theorized most notably by 
Robinson (2000) and described above by Marchais (2020) as an explainer 
of how racialization is itself a source of production. Foregrounding these 
arguments about the interrelation between the socially constructed body 
and the emergence of legal property forms is a history of non-European 
indigenous jurisprudence in which real property is understood differently. 
For example, indigenous knowledges either personified property, saw it 
as intimately tied to human relationality or communally held (not owned), 
and ecological protection was usually the purview of women (Dudgeon 
& Berkes 2003; NoiseCat 2017). Legal education’s preoccupation with 
private law and protecting the rights of law’s human in property leave 
untroubled the ways in which dehumanization enabled the tandem of 
dispossession and accumulation of land and capital and how this results 
in further dehumanization. 
The last theme which I argue could be explored within decolonial 
thought is time. Of main concern here is the way in which the creation of 
modernity dislocates bodies from space and place while simultaneously 
producing artificed time demarcations to justify these dislocations. 
As Mignolo states, ‘“Modernity” implied the colonization of time and 
the invention of the “Middle Ages”’ (Delgado & Ors 2000: 29). This is 
because an artificial Euro-modern timeline was colonially abstracted 
by the colonial enterprise. The result of which was to place colonized 
spaces/people in an earlier timeline, outside the development process of 
humanity (Alcoff 2007: 84), where they are eternally and futilely striving 
to reach Europe (both metaphorically but also physically). This temporal 
displacement obscures the contingent nature of the temporalities of 
colonized and colonizer spaces. In other words, left uninterrogated is how 
the colonized experience of modernity is contingent on the way in which 
the colonizer experiences modernity and vice versa. Or, as Olaniyan says, 
in explaining why African poverty is predicated on Euro-modern extraction 
443Should We Rethink the Purposes of the Law School?
Spring 2021
and accumulation, ‘it is absolutely ridiculous to think that Congo is not 
modern, but Belgium is’ (2014). Olaniyan is alluding here to Belgium’s 
brutal colonial activities in what was called the Belgian Congo, which 
involved racialized use of enslaved, enforced and torture-compelled labour 
to work rubber and oil palm plantations, resulting in a population loss of 
roughly 50 per cent of Congolese (Hochschild 1999: 3, 233, 280). These 
epistemic creations of imagined temporality also manifest themselves in 
legal education in fragmentation within and across units/modules. For 
example, the distinctions we draw between, immigration, citizenship, the 
state and colonial histories. Decolonial thought requires unsettling those 
fragmentations.
I have used this tripartite thematic framework as an alternative to 
attempts to ‘decolonize’ units/modules rather than question the selection 
of and demarcation within the curriculum of legal education. Thinking more 
thematically prevents the atomization that characterizes contemporary 
decolonization discourse in UK higher education. These discourses 
focus on adding more authors from Black or Brown backgrounds to 
reading lists, as well as introducing, as supplements, topics that raise 
questions about racialization and empire. Thinking thematically allows 
us to simultaneously trouble the discipline while continually crafting 
decolonial thought. Therefore, rather than ask, for example, ‘How do we 
decolonize the law of contract?’, we are able to question the possibilities 
that eventuate the emergence and social production of the law of contract 
and its underpinning normativities, as well as conceptualize what future 
possibilities that questioning may lead us to. In this way, we can, thinking 
about the future of legal education and the world, within the scope of 
legal education, centre flourishing human futures of freedom and justice, 
and not the sacrament of the law of contract.
It should be noted that the massification of universities and 
consumerization of the student class present a significant deterrent 
to decolonial thought. This deterrence is exemplified by the various 
standardization measures across higher education. The Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) as well as the National Student Survey are 
both examples of this standardization. Sayer describes the process of 
evaluating research through the REF as impervious to critique of British 
research standards (2014: 40), indicating that the REF standards may 
be incompatible with the necessarily unsettling nature of decolonial 
thought. In other words, the types of rankings which universities 
increasingly rely on require favouring epistemologies and bodies already 
privileged, mainstream and highly regarded, and this will not lead us 
to ‘worlds otherwise’. This deterrence also includes rising tuition fees, 
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casualization, unmanageable workloads, pay gaps, funding models and 
access to higher education. The university seems to be suffering an 
identity crisis. Is it a public good or a consumer good? The decolonial 
approaches recommended in the foregoing paragraphs seek to disrupt 
the colonial logics of commodification of space, nature, humanity and 
variably valued labour. But it seems that the neoliberal university can 
only survive through these very characteristics – namely, the colonial 
logics of commodification of space, nature, humanity and variably valued 
labour.
[E] CONCLUSION
This article has argued that law schools in the UK have failed to 
interrogate how colonial thought is embedded in legal education and 
that that embedment is complicit in producing this present system and 
its inequality. Diversity measures, without more, are insufficient to 
disrupt the reproduction of our unequal world and bring forth ‘otherwise 
worlds’. However, our engagement with decolonial thought must involve 
a fundamental rethinking of the purposes of legal education and how 
reconstructing legal epistemologies may result in flourishing futures for 
all. Therefore, our commitment to decolonial thought must be intellectually 
rigorous and sustained. It must also consider seriously the deterrence 
produced by the systems we are seeking to change. In other words, to be 
effective in transforming the world, decolonial thought in legal education 
must reach beneath the surface, continually reinvent itself and look 
beyond the present with radical imagination for the future at its core.
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